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IMMUNITY OR IMPUNITY?
THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF
PROSECUTIONS OF STATE OFFICIALS FOR
CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN STATES
LIKE THE UNITED STATES THAT ARE NOT
PARTIES TO THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Mark A. Summers*
I. INTRODUCTION

H

ugo Grotius, often called the father of international law,1 would
be shocked to learn that in the 21st century the international
community asserts the right to prosecute state officials for international
crimes. Only since World War II has international law expanded to impose individual criminal responsibility on state officials.2 A series of international criminal law conventions has been adopted which obligates
states to extradite or prosecute international criminals found within their
territories, regardless of where the crimes were committed.3 International
tribunals have been created to deal with the most heinous crimes and the
most prominent wrongdoers, while national tribunals, which are left to
prosecute the lesser malefactors, remain an integral part of this developing system of international criminal law enforcement.4
This substantial progress notwithstanding, few convictions of international criminals would have been possible if traditional concepts of state

* Professor of Law, Barry University, Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law, B.A.,
Washington and Jefferson College; J.D., West Virginia University; LL.M (International
Law), Cambridge University. I would like to thank my colleagues, Barry Dubner, Lee
Schinasi and Brian Holland for reading drafts of this article and making many helpful
suggestions that improved it, as well as my former research assistant, Jenny Nash. I
would also like to thank the Barry University School of Law for its support in the writing
of this article.
1. J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (9th ed. 1984).
2. See, e.g., infra Part II.D, Part V.
3. See, e.g., Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs art. 36(2)(a)(iv), Mar. 30, 1961,
520 U.N.T.S. 151; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation art. 6(1), Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages art. 6(1), Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art.
6(1), Dec. 12, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112.
4. See infra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
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immunity had continued to be recognized by the courts,5 because until
the middle of the last century, the immunity of a state and its ruler from
the jurisdiction of another state’s courts was regarded as absolute, as per
Louis XIV’s famous quip, “L’état c’est moi.”6 Fortunately, in the latter
half of the 20th century, cracks began to appear in the doctrine of absolute immunity for states and state officials. Accordingly, a state’s immunity was limited to its noncommercial, public, or in other words, official
acts. As a result, the immunity of state officials developed into two
branches: absolute immunity, known as ratione personae or inviolability,
which applied to heads of state and some other state officials during their
terms in office, and a more limited form of immunity, known as ratione
materiae or subject matter or functional immunity, which shielded all
state officials from the jurisdiction of another state’s courts for acts
committed in their “official capacities.”7 In 2002, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) had its first opportunity to address the issue of state official immunity in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium.8 Faced with
the question whether Belgium’s issuance of an arrest warrant for
Congo’s foreign minister violated international law, the Court held that
the inviolability from the jurisdiction of another state’s courts that attached to an incumbent foreign minister prohibited another state from
engaging even in preliminary acts of investigation and prosecution for
core international crimes during the foreign minister’s term of office.9 In
so doing, the Court rejected the argument that a customary law of state
official immunity had developed since World War II so as to include an
exception applicable in national courts for the most serious, or core in-

5. See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Efforts to
define the concept of international crime and the reach of human rights, and to hold violators accountable, would amount to no more than emblematic gestures unless those reforms were accompanied by a corresponding dismantling of the long-standing doctrinal
bastions that have impeded the exercise of domestic and international jurisdiction over
state officials for violation of the new standards.”).
6. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 475:16 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 5th ed.
1999).
7. Yoram Dinstein, Diplomatic Immunity from Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae, 15
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 76, 80 (1966) (“[D]iplomatic immunity ratione materiae and ratione
personae became sharply distinguished from one another: the former consists of a permanent substantive immunity from the applicability of local law while the latter merely
comprises a transitory procedural exemption from judicial process.”).
8. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) (Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/
icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF (last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
9. See id. at 21.
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ternational crimes,10 treating state official immunity as an area of settled
law,11 instead of a developing rule with parameters that are still unclear.12
This Article will focus on the impact of the ICJ’s decision on the immunity of state officials from prosecution for core international crimes in
national courts and its interrelationship with the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Its basic premise is that the decision in
Congo v. Belgium can plausibly be read to mean that the immunities of
state officials from prosecution for core crimes in national courts remains
intact. As a result, there is a danger that national courts will apply Congo
v. Belgium to immunize state officials charged with core crimes. And,
since the jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary, or secondary, to that
of the states,13 it must defer to any state, even a non-party to the treaty,
that in good faith investigates and/or prosecutes a crime within its jurisdiction.14 In these circumstances the ICC can claim the right to prosecute,
only when a state is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”15 The ICC Statute, while it abrogates state
official immunity for the core crimes within its jurisdiction, preserves
those same immunities for non-party states.16 In light of Congo v. Belgium, could it plausibly be argued that a state prosecution lacked genu10. This Article will use the term “core crimes” to refer to all the offenses within the
jurisdiction of the ICC (war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide) as well as
torture. See Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials be Tried for International
Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 868
(2002) (discussing the legal implications of the ICJ decision) [hereinafter Cassese, Comments]; Steffen Wirth, Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s Judgment in the Congo v.
Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 877, 882–85 (discussing state immunity and its exceptions).
11. See Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 22.
12. Cf. Joseph W. Dellapanna, Head-of-State Immunity—Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act—Suggestion by the Department of State, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 528, 531 (1994) (“We
are left, then, with an at best amorphous legal doctrine [(head of state immunity)] whose
very existence is not entirely settled in U.S. law and whose reach is almost completely
uncertain.”); Jerrold L. Mallory, Note, Resolving The Confusion Over Head of State Immunity: The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 177 (1986) (“While a survey of the international community’s approach to head of state immunity reveals wide
agreement that heads of state are entitled to some immunity, there is no consensus on the
extent of that immunity.”).
13. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Preamble art. 1, Jul. 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter ICC Statute].
14. Id. art. 17(1)(a).
15. Id.
16. Compare id. art. 27 (stating the irrelevance of official capacity with regard to
criminal liability), with art. 98(1) (asserting the ICC’s inability to require States to act
inconsistently with their international obligations).
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ineness if it extended immunity to a state official who committed international crimes?
The Article will first briefly trace the development of state official immunity until the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) by the United States Congress in 1976.17 At this watershed, state
immunity diverged from state official immunity.18 Thereafter, until the
decision in Congo v. Belgium, courts in the United States struggled with
and divided over how to resolve questions of state official immunity,
demonstrating the need for clear guidance on this issue. Instead of providing the needed clarity, Congo v. Belgium did the opposite since it is
susceptible to equally possible interpretations: 1) that there is no exception to state official immunity for core crimes in national courts; or 2)
that there is an exception to the immunity of state officials in national
courts when they are charged with core crimes. A dissection of the
sources on which the ICJ relied resolves this quandary by revealing that
the latter interpretation is the more viable. Finally, the Article will examine the immunity provisions of the ICC Statute and demonstrate how officials from states, like the U.S., that are not parties to the ICC Statute
could permanently escape the jurisdiction of the ICC.
II. THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. The State and the Sovereign are One
Initially, there was no distinction between the immunities that a state
and its ruler enjoyed from the jurisdiction of foreign courts.19 In this form
of “absolute” immunity, the term “absolute” had dual significance: 1)
there was “absolute” identity between the state and its ruler;20 and, 2)
both were “absolutely,” i.e., without exception, immune from the juris-

17. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976) [hereinafter
FSIA].
18. Since the passage of the FSIA, U.S. courts have struggled with the question
whether it or a common law immunity controls in suits naming sitting heads of state. See
infra Part II.C–D.
19. Shobha Varughese George, Note, Head-of-State Immunity in the United States
Courts: Still Confused After All These Years, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1056 (1995)
(“Historically, sovereign immunity for states and heads-of-state immunity were considered one and the same . . . .”).
20. For example, in the seminal United States Supreme Court case, The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, Chief Justice Marshall refers to the state (France) anthropomorphically as “NAPOLEON, the reigning emperor of the French,” or the “prince,” or by the
personal pronoun, “he.” The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 passim
(1812).
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diction of another state’s courts.21 At this stage of the development of
sovereign immunity, it was a rule based on reciprocity, convenience, and
practicality predicated on the consent of all sovereigns not to exercise the
absolute sovereignty they enjoyed over conduct within their territories.22
B. The Twentieth Century: Separation Anxiety
Over the next century, the model of the United States—antimonarchical and pro-democratic—led to a rapid decline in the number of
monarchies, and, even in countries like Great Britain where monarchs
remained, the powers and functions of government shifted away from the
king or queen to an elected government.23 Thus, by the middle of the
twentieth century, state immunity had begun to separate from head of
state immunity, and diplomatic immunity emerged as a distinctly separate branch of the law.24
As states, or state-created entities, entered increasingly into commercial transactions with one another, they needed to be able to enforce
these commercial agreements in court.25 The result was the doctrine of

21. Id. at 136–40. There were three instances of immunity from the “absolute and
complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers”: 1)
“the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign
territory;” 2) “the immunity which all civilized nations allow to foreign ministers;” and,
3) “a sovereign is understood to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction . . . where he
allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions.” Id.
22. Marshall wrote:
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights
and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with
each other, and by an interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in
practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and
complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers.
Id. at 136.
23. See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 445 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM].
24. Id. § 447 n.2 (“The law relating to the position of Heads of State abroad has affinities with, but is now separate from, that relating to state immunity (which has a common origin in the identification of a sovereign with his state) and the treatment of diplomatic envoys (who also represent sovereign states).”).
25. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–
14 (1976) (quoting Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the United States
Department of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952)).
Tate summarized the then current state practice:
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“restricted” sovereign immunity, exemplified by the 1952 Tate Letter,
which exempted a state’s purely commercial activities from absolute
immunity in the courts of another state.26 The Tate Letter reflected the
United States’ position that restricted immunity was emerging as a feature of customary international law.27 Moreover, it suggested that at least
four exceptions to absolute immunity already existed in U.S. practice—
disputes in contract and tort, disputes relating to its merchant vessels, and
disputes based on a government’s “commercial activities.”28
Following the Tate Letter, whether foreign states were accorded immunity in U.S. courts became a political matter because the State Department began to issue “suggestions of immunity” which were binding
on the courts.29 It was primarily to eliminate the problems that had arisen
as a result of the suggestion of immunity procedure,30 that Congress
It is thus evident that with the possible exception of the United Kingdom little
support has been found except on the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites
for continued full acceptance of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity.
There are evidences that British authorities are aware of its deficiencies and
ready for a change. The reasons which obviously motivate state trading countries in adhering to the theory with perhaps increasing rigidity are most persuasive that the United States should change its policy. Furthermore, the granting
of sovereign immunity to foreign governments in the courts of the United
States is most inconsistent with the action of the Government of the United
States in subjecting itself to suit in these same courts in both contract and tort
and with its long established policy of not claiming immunity in foreign jurisdictions for its merchant vessels. Finally, the Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing
business with them to have their rights determined in the courts. For these reasons it will hereafter be the Department’s policy to follow the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments
for a grant of sovereign immunity.
Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Restricted state immunity was recognized by the Supreme Court in cases such as
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983), which states,
“[I]mmunity is confined to suits involving the foreign sovereign’s public acts, and does
not extend to cases arising out of a foreign state’s strictly commercial acts.”
29. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
30. Suggestions of immunity invaded the province of the court by determining questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, i.e., whether a state’s acts were public
(jure imperii) and therefore immune, or whether its acts were private (jure gestionis) and
therefore not. See, e.g., George, supra note 19, at 1058 (“This method, however, was
flawed because judicial reliance on State Department ‘suggestions’ led to inconsistent,
and often politically-motivated results.”).
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passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976, transferring the
determination of questions of sovereign immunity to the federal courts.31
Some states, particularly those with a common law legal tradition, followed the United States’ statutory approach to restricted state immunity,32 while others reached the same position via court decisions.33
C. Post-FSIA State Immunity
The FSIA codified restrictive sovereign immunity.34 Structurally, it retained immunity for a “foreign state,” 35 which includes its “political subdivision[s]”36 and “agenc[ies] or instrumentalit[ies].”37 States are immune from the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts, except in those cases provided for in the statute.38 The exceptions are: 1) waiver, 2) disputes over
commercial activities, 3) disputes over rights to property “taken in violation of international law,” 4) disputes over rights to immovable property
or property acquired by succession or gift in the U.S., 5) torts committed
31. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000) (“Claims of foreign states to immunity should
henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in conformity with
the principles set forth in [the FSIA].”).
32. E.g., State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, § 15 (Eng.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123
[hereinafter State Immunity Act 1978]; State Immunity Act, R.S.C., c. S-18 (1985), reprinted in 21 I.L.M 798 (1982); Foreign States Immunities Act, 1985, pt. 5, § 42 (Austl.),
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 715 (1986).
33. E.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 12,
1983 (F.R.G.), translated in 22 I.L.M. 1279; Cour de cassation [Cass. 1e civ.] [Court of
Cassation], Mar. 14, 1984, J.C.P. 1984, II, 20205, note Gulphe (Fr.), translated in 23
I.L.M. 1062; Corte cost., 15 July 1992, n.31, Gazz. Uff. 1992 (It.), translated in 33 I.L.M.
593 (1994).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)–(7) (2000).
35. Id. § 1602 (“Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction
of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them
in connection with their commercial activities.”).
36. Id. § 1603(a).
37. Section 1603(b) defines an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” as:
any entity—
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of the United States . . . , nor created under the
laws of any third country.
Id. § 1603 (b).
38. Id. § 1604.

470

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 31:2

in the U.S. by a foreign state, 6) enforcement of agreements to arbitrate,
and 7) terrorist acts (including torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, and hostage taking) that result in the personal injury or death of a
U.S. national committed by states that have been designated as state
sponsors of terrorism.39
The FSIA represents a functional (ratione materiae) approach to state
immunity that is no longer absolute but rather is linked to the legitimate,
public functions of the state. But, because it authorizes jurisdiction over a
foreign state only in a limited and carefully circumscribed number of
circumstances,40 it has stunted the growth of a more expansive approach
to the liability of foreign states in U.S. courts.41
The FSIA does contain two exceptions, torts and terrorism, both of
which can be based on conduct that is also a crime. This suggests that
Congress regarded such acts as non-public, because otherwise it would
have exempted them from the immunity that shields state acts.42 Moreover, in two cases in which the FSIA’s jurisdictional prerequisites were
met,43 U.S. courts held that states sponsoring core crimes are not immune
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)–(7).
40. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (stating that
unless a FSIA exception is satisfied, U.S. courts lack “subject matter jurisdiction.”); Argentine Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 441 (1989) (concluding that
FSIA does not permit suits for torts committed outside the United States). The terrorism
exception applies only to terrorist acts committed by citizens of states designated by the
State Department as “state sponsors of terrorism” that occur outside the foreign (defendant) state and whose victims are nationals of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(7)(A)–(B).
41. The FSIA exceptions require that the tort be committed in the United States under
section 1605(a)(5), and that the terrorist act be committed outside the territory of a terrorist state and have as its victim a U.S. national under section 1605(a)(7)(B). In almost all
of the post-World War II cases where states have been accused of international crimes,
those crimes involve acts committed in those states against their nationals. By definition,
then, they would fail the FSIA’s jurisdictional tests. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 403 (1995).
42. Cf. Letelier v. Rep. of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 671 (D.D.C. 1980) (“Nowhere is
there an indication that the tortious acts to which the Act makes reference are to only be
those formerly classified as ‘private,’ thereby engrafting onto the statute, as the Republic
of Chile would have the Court do, the requirement that the character of a given tortious
act be judicially analyzed to determine whether it was of the type heretofore denoted as
jure gestionis or should be classified as jure imperii.”).
43. In Letelier v. Republic of Chile, the court held that Chile was not immune from
suit in tort for assassinations, allegedly the work of the Chilean national intelligence service, which took place in the United States, thus satisfying the “tort” exception to the
FSIA. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). Rejecting Chile’s contention that the killings fell
within exceptions to the “tort” exception because they were “discretionary function[s]”
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from suit.44 By hypothesis, this reasoning would apply to state officials
whose immunity ratione materiae is no more or less than the state’s.45
D. State Official Immunity
The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity applied to state officials
as well; that is, they were immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts
in so far as they acted in their “official” capacities on behalf of the state.
In that case, the state official’s act is attributable solely to the state that
bears responsibility for it.46 As a consequence, this form of immunity

and therefore immune under the FSIA, the court stated: “Whatever policy options may
exist for a foreign country, it has no ‘discretion’ to perpetrate conduct designed to result
in the assassination of an individual or individuals, action that is clearly contrary to the
precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and international law.” Letelier, 488
F. Supp. at 673 (emphasis added). In Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, the court found that
the “extrajudicial killings” of American nationals over international waters by the Cuban
Air Force not only satisfied the FSIA terrorism exception but also provided a basis for
plaintiffs to seek punitive damages because “[t]he ban on extrajudicial killing . . . rises to
the level of jus cogens, a norm of international law so fundamental that it is binding on all
members of the international community.” Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp.
1239, 1252 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (citing, inter alia, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 702(c) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)], which
states, “A state violates [customary] international law if, as a matter of state policy, it
practices, encourages, or condones . . . the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals . . . .”).
44. But see, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that FSIA does not permit a suit for a jus cogens violation of international law (torture) that occurred outside the United States); Princz v. Fed. Republic of
Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding Germany immune under the
FSIA for atrocities committed in Germany during the holocaust); accord Sampson v. Fed.
Republic of Germany, 975 F. Supp. 1108, 1116 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Persinger v. Islamic
Rep. of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding Iran immune from claims
based on hostage taking outside the United States); Smith v. Libya, 886 F. Supp. 306, 315
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding Libya immune from claims stemming from the Lockerbie
bombing), aff’d 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Al-Adsani v. Gov’t of Kuwait, 107
I.L.R. 536, 550 (1996) (holding Kuwait immune from allegations of torture committed
outside the United Kingdom).
45. Cf. OPPENHEIM, supra note 23, at § 509 n.11 (“In respect of official acts it may
not be so much a question of immunity from the jurisdiction of the local courts, but rather
a matter of those courts being without competence rationae materiae over the acts, which
pertain to the public activities of a foreign state.”).
46. Cassese, Comments, supra note 10, at 862 (“The first category [immunity ratione
materiae] is grounded on the notion that a state official is not accountable to other states
for acts that he accomplishes in his official capacity and that therefore must be attributed
to the state.”).
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ratione materiae applies both during and after an official’s term of office.47
It is debatable whether a separate doctrine of head of state immunity
even existed prior to the passage of the FSIA.48 In the rare pre-FSIA
cases where a head of state was sued individually, courts seemed to apply the restrictive theory of state immunity.49 A state’s functional immunity (ratione materiae) did not, however, fully cover its head of state in
situations in which she or he traveled abroad and while in a foreign country might be faced with arrest or service of civil process.50 Not surprisingly then, the concept of inviolability from arrest or suit (immunity ratione personae) was imported from the law of diplomatic immunity and
adapted to heads of state.51
Because the FSIA does not refer specifically to heads of state or state
officials, U.S. courts have divided over the question of the scope of their
immunities. Some, like the court in Lafontant v. Aristide,52 have concluded that incumbent heads of state are inviolable from either criminal
or civil process, because individuals are not “agencies or instrumentalities” as defined by the FSIA.53 Thus, State Department “suggestions of
47. Id. at 863.
48. See, e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“At
the time of the FSIA’s adoption, no widely accepted international practice established a
separately standing principle of head-of-state immunity. In fact, prior to 1976 the doctrine
of sovereign immunity was generally understood to encompass solely state immunity.
Consequently, any reference to a head-of-state immunity ‘doctrine’ as a concept distinct
from foreign state immunity is a construct that does not arise in the case law and commentary as a specifically identified and widely recognized legal principle until after
1976.”).
49. See, e.g., Ex-King Farouk of Egypt v. Christian Dior, S.A.R.L., 24 I.L.R. 228,
228, Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Apr. 11, 1957 (finding sitting
king immune from suit in France for cost of wife’s wardrobe but could be sued after he
was deposed); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 66 (1965) (under the restrictive theory, head of state immunity is the
same as state immunity).
50. See, e.g., Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 308–09 (dealing with an attempt to serve
Zimbabwe’s president with civil process while visiting New York to attend a U.N. conference).
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 464, Reporters’ Notes 14 (“Heads of
state or government. Ordinarily, a proceeding against a head of state or government that
is in essence a suit against the state is treated like a claim against the state for purposes of
immunity. When a head of state or government comes on an official visit to another
country, he is generally given the same personal inviolability and immunities as are accorded to members of special missions, essentially those of an accredited diplomat.”).
52. See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
53. See also Estate of Domingo v. Republic of Philippines, 808 F.2d 1349, 1350 (9th
Cir. 1987) (finding sitting head of state immune from claim based on murder of two op-
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immunity” remain binding on the courts in those cases and cases of diplomatic and consular immunity, which likewise are not covered by the
FSIA.54 The opposite approach, adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Chuidian
v. Phillipine National Bank,55 is that a suit against a state official acting
in his official capacity was tantamount to a suit against the state itself.56
Accordingly, under this approach, the determination of state immunity
questions belongs exclusively to the courts, applying the rules found in
the FSIA.57 A third strain in the U.S. case law is illustrated by Tachiona
v. Mugabe, where the court allowed service of civil process on a sitting
head of state in his “private” capacity as an officer of an organization
accused of the murder, torture, terrorism, rape, and beatings of his political opponents.58 In so holding, the court rejected both the absolute inviolability approach of Aristide and Chuidian’s holding that the FSIA had
completely supplanted the pre-FSIA procedure of using suggestions of
immunity in cases involving sitting heads of state:
While [there are] . . . valid grounds for the courts to honor the State
Department’s suggestions of immunity . . . over a recognized sitting
head of state that would subject the foreign official to be hauled into
position union leaders); Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 129 (finding incumbent Haitian president immune from civil suit based on assassination of political opponent); Saltany v.
Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding British prime minister immune from
suit for damages arising from U.S. bombing of Libya).
54. Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 136–37.
55. Chuidian v. Phillippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990). In Chuidian,
the government filed a “statement of interest.” Id. at 1099. Unlike a “suggestion of immunity,” which was binding on the court, a “statement of interest” merely suggests “that
courts decline to exercise jurisdiction in particular cases implicating sovereign immunity.” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004).
56. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1102. While the term “official capacity” is not used in
§ 1603(b) of the FSIA, it is that element, according to the Chuidian court, which makes a
“suit against an individual . . . the practical equivalent of a suit against the sovereign directly.” Id. at 1101. Thus, “Daza must be granted immunity as an instrumentality of the
Republic of the Philippines . . . .” Id. at 1106. However, “[p]lainly Daza would not be
entitled to sovereign immunity for acts not committed in his official capacity.” Id.
57. Id. at 1103. According to the Chuidian court,
The principal distinction between pre-1976 common law practice and post-1976
statutory practice is the role of the State Department. If individual immunity is to
be determined in accordance with the [former], presumably we would once again
be required to give conclusive weight to the State Department’s determination of
whether an individual’s activities fall within the traditional exceptions to sovereign
immunity.
Id. at 1102.
58. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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court and potentially be exposed to personal liability, the Court finds
uncompelling the further contention that the doctrine requires courts to
give conclusive effect to the State Department’s advice with regard to
the appropriateness of service of process upon a head-of-state as it
arises in this case.59

By this view, immunity ratione personae does not mean absolute inviolability from all judicial processes of foreign courts.60
While all of the above are civil cases, application of the contrasting approaches represented by Lafontant and Chuidian might lead to different
results in criminal cases.61 According to the former, the incumbent official would be entitled to absolute immunity regardless of the nature of
her crime.62 On the other hand, the result under Chuidian would depend
upon whether the official’s crime was deemed “public” and therefore
immune, or “private” and therefore not immune.63 Chuidian is thus
clearly at odds with the prevailing view of immunity ratione personae
exemplified by Congo v. Belgium64 and more closely resembles the
analysis that would be appropriate in cases involving immunity ratione
materiae, where only “official” conduct would be immune. In the few
U.S. cases that do deal with the immunity of a state official charged with
conduct that resembles a core violation of international law, the trend
appears to be away from deeming any such conduct as “official.”65
59. Id. at 305; see also Estate of Domingo, 808 F.2d at 1350 (finding an order immunizing President of the Philippines from civil suit did not shield him from a deposition
subpoena in the same action).
60. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31(1)(c), Apr. 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter VCDR] (“[A diplomatic agent] shall also enjoy immunity from [the receiving State’s] civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in
the case of: . . . (c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised
by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.”).
61. A court following Tachiona presumably would reach the same result as in Lafontant, i.e., that the State Department’s suggestion of immunity would be binding in cases
where there was an attempt to exercise the territorial jurisdiction of the court in order to
arrest or prosecute an incumbent head of state. Cf. Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 270, with
Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 132.
62. Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“We need not consider whether an act of President Aristide in ordering the killing [of a political opponent]
would be official or private because he now enjoys head-of-state immunity.”).
63. See Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1104.
64. See infra Part III.
65. Cf. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239–40 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The Executive
Branch has emphatically restated in this litigation its position that private persons may be
found liable under the Alien Tort Act for acts of genocide, war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law.”); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 175–76
(D. Mass. 1995) (finding no FSIA immunity for former defense minister accused of tor-
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The doctrine of state immunity is in disarray in the United States. First,
the FSIA has blocked a number of civil actions based on the commission
of core crimes that could have contributed to the development of a rule
that such acts are not the public acts of states.66 Second, the courts are
divided on the impact of the FSIA on suits against individuals. As the
divergent approaches in Lafontant v. Aristide, Chuidian v. Phillipine National Bank, and Tachiona v. Mugabe illustrate, the courts have yet to
conceive of or apply a consistent doctrine in deciding whether individuals are immune from suit or not. This may be due, in part, to the fact that
U.S. courts almost never use the terms immunity ratione personae and
immunity ratione materiae, and, as a result, they have not clearly identified the distinctions between the two doctrines.67 Thus, a definitive opinion on state immunity from the ICJ could have benefited the development of the law in the U.S.
III. ENTER CONGO V. BELGIUM
On April 11, 2000, a Belgian investigating magistrate issued an international arrest warrant for Adbulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (Yerodia), then
the incumbent foreign minister of the Congo.68 Yerodia was alleged to
have made “speeches inciting racial hatred during the month of August

ture, arbitrary detention, and disappearance, which are “acts . . . beyond the scope of the
official’s authority”); In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 571 (N.D. Ohio
1985) (finding “political offense” exception to extradition inapplicable in cases where
defendant is charged with crimes that are “inconsistent with international standards of
civilized conduct.”); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“To
the extent that Pena might have expected that Paraguay would not hold him responsible
for his official acts, that was not a ‘justified’ expectation . . . .”).
66. See supra notes 40–44.
67. This may, in part, be due to the “act of state” doctrine in U.S. courts. Indeed, the
similarities between a recent statement by the U.S. Supreme Court defining the act of
state doctrine and the ICJ’s definition of immunity ratione materiae are striking. Compare Rep. of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004) (“Unlike a claim of sovereign
immunity, which merely raises a jurisdictional defense, the act of state doctrine provides
foreign states with a substantive defense on the merits.”), with Congo v. Belgium, 2002
I.C.J. 3, 22 (Feb. 14) (“Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in
nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity
may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate
the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility.”). While a definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Article, a tentative conclusion may be
that U.S. courts refer to the act of state doctrine in the same way that foreign courts use
the term immunity ratione materiae.
68. Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 8.
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1998,”69 which constituted grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and their two 1977 Additional Protocols.70 These international
crimes were punishable in Belgium pursuant to a 1999 law that gave its
courts jurisdiction over such offenses “wheresoever they may have been
committed,”71 and also contained the provision that “[i]mmunity attaching to the official capacity of a person shall not prevent application of the
present Law.”72 Congo protested by filing an application and a request
for provisional measures before the ICJ claiming, inter alia, that the Belgian law’s abrogation of the immunity of a sitting foreign minister was a
“‘[v]iolation of the diplomatic immunity of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State . . . .’”73
The Court proceeded to the merits of the immunity question “assuming” that the Belgian judge had jurisdiction to issue the arrest warrant in
the first place.74 The Court reasoned that the immunities of incumbent
diplomatic and consular agents, and “certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs,” must be sufficient so that the official will not be
hindered “in the performance of his or her duties.”75 Sitting foreign ministers and heads of state must therefore be accorded both “full immunity”
69. Id.
70. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field ch. IX, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea ch. VIII, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 74
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 74 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War pt. IV, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 609 [hereinafter, collectively, the Geneva Conventions].
71. Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian
Law (Belg.), Feb. 10, 1999, art. 5(3), translated in 38 I.L.M. 918, 924 (1999).
72. Id. art. 7.
73. Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 9.
74. Initially, Congo had challenged Belgium’s assertion of universal jurisdiction as a
“[v]iolation of the principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of
another State and of the principle of sovereign equality among all Members of the United
Nations . . . .” Id. Congo abandoned these arguments in its Memorial and at oral argument. Id. at 10. Mark A. Summers, The International Court of Justice’s Decision in
Congo v. Belgium: How Has It Affected The Development of a Principle of Universal
Jurisdiction That Would Obligate All States to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 63, 67–68 (2003).
75. See Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 18–20.
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and “inviolability” from the criminal jurisdiction of another state because
any assertion of another state’s criminal process could affect their ability
to travel internationally, one of their essential job functions.76
Next, the Court had to dispose of Belgium’s argument that an exception to “full immunity” and “inviolability” ratione personae now exists
for those incumbent state officials accused of war crimes or crimes
against humanity.77 The Court flatly rejected the contention that there
was state practice78 that supported the existence of such an exception.
Nor did the statutes of the various international criminal tribunals established since World War II, all of which specifically abolished “official
position” immunity, amount to “state practice” because “these rules . . .
do not enable [the Court] to conclude that any such exception exists in
customary international law in regard to national courts.”79 Similarly,
none of the cases of the international tribunals deals with “the question of
the immunities of Ministers of Foreign Affairs before national courts
where they are accused of having committed war crimes or crimes
against humanity.”80
Thus, the Court was “unable to deduce . . . that there exists under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed
war crimes or crimes against humanity.”81 The Court then ventured even
further to outline the exceptions to “the immunities enjoyed under international law by an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs.”82
76. See id. at 20. See, e.g., VCDR, supra note 60, at art. 29 (“The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.”); id. art. 31(1) (“A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State.”).
77. Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 20.
78. Belgium had specifically cited the Pinochet case in the United Kingdom and the
Qaddafi case in France as examples of such state practice. Id. The ICJ accepted Congo’s
contention that neither of these cases stood for the abrogation of absolute immunity for
“incumbent” heads of state and foreign ministers. Id. at 21.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. The Court did not mention or refer to the commentators who have urged that such
an exception exists. See, e.g., Cassese, Comments, supra note 10, at 866–69. But see
Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 20 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/
icobe_ijudgment_20020214_higgins-kooijmans-buergenthal.PDF.
82. The “exceptions” are: 1) “such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their own countries;” 2) they cease to enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of another state “if the State they represent or have represented decides to waive that
immunity;” 3) a former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be prosecuted by another state
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Although this portion of its opinion is clearly obiter dictum, binding only
the parties to the case and therefore has no formal precedential value,
there is no doubt that Congo v. Belgium will substantially affect the development of the law of state official immunity in both international and
national courts.83
IV. IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO STATE OFFICIAL IMMUNITY FOR CORE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES?
The Congo v. Belgium decision might be read narrowly as applying
only to the immunities ratione personae of incumbent foreign ministers.
However, its sweeping conclusion—that there is no customary international law exception “to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers of Foreign affairs,
where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes
against humanity”84—may not be so neatly cabined in future cases.85 Indeed, a broader reading of Congo v. Belgium is also plausible: There is
no customary law exception to the immunity, ratione personae or ratione
materiae, of state officials from the “criminal jurisdiction” of foreign
courts, even for core international crimes.86 And, while a careful examination of the sources relied upon by the Court does not support such an
“in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as
in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity;” and, 4)
“an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings before certain international courts, where they have jurisdiction.” Congo, 2002
I.C.J. para. 61.
83. As Henkin writes, “A decision of the International Court of Justice is not binding
on states other than the parties to the case, but judicial decisions are ‘subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law’ (article 38 of the Statute of the Court), and decisions of
the court are highly authoritative.” LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 49 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the Nicaragua case).
84. Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 21.
85. See infra Part VI.
86. Even one of the most distinguished scholars of international law has read this
portion of the Court’s opinion differently at different times. Compare Cassese, Comments, supra note 10, at 865 (“Although the Court’s proposition is very sweeping, the
context of the Court’s ruling would seem to indicate that the Court did not intend to deny
the possible existence of a customary rule lifting functional immunities for state officials
in the case of international crimes. In fact, it did not take any stand on such a customary
rule.”), with Antonio Cassese, The Belgian Court of Cassation v. The International Court
of Justice: The Sharon and Others Case, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 437, 444 (2003) (“As I
pointed out at the outset of this paper, the ICJ held, although not in explicit terms, that the
functional immunity accruing to a minister of foreign affairs . . . does not cease when the
person is accused of an international crime.”) [hereinafter Cassese, The Sharon and Others Case].
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expansive reading of the case, regrettably, the opinion itself leaves us to
guess the Court’s actual position.
A. State Practice
The Court said it had analyzed the state legislation that does exist and
found it wanting in its support for the existence of an exception to state
official immunity for core international crimes.87 The Court also apparently accepted Congo’s interpretation that Regina v. Bartle and the
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet88 and the Qaddafi89 case “confirm the absolute nature of the immunity from criminal process of Heads of State and Ministers for Foreign
Affairs.”90 A closer analysis of the cases is necessary in order to appreciate the import of this conclusion.
First, since Pinochet was a former head of state, the extent of incumbent head of state immunity for torture was not squarely before the two
different panels of the House of Lords that considered the case.91 Nonetheless, altogether seven of the Law Lords posited that an exception to
87. In this regard, it is telling that the Court did not refer to the 1999 Belgian law, Act
Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law
(Belg.), Feb. 10, 1999, translated in 38 I.L.M. 918, 924 (1999), on which Congo v. Belgium itself was based and which specifically abolished head of state immunity for core
crimes. See also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
art. IV, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (“Persons committing genocide . . . shall be
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals.”); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 (“‘[T]orture’ means
any act by which severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . by
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity . . . .”). There are currently 137 state parties to the
Genocide Convention and 140 state parties to the Torture Convention. Multilateral Treaties Deposited With the Secretary-General, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/
englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty1.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). For a discussion of the significance of state ratifications of international conventions as state practice,
see infra text accompanying notes 126–39.
88. Regina v. Bartle & the Comm’r of Police for the Metropolis & Others Ex Parte
Pinochet (Pinochet II), [2000] 1 A.C. 119 (H.L. 1999) reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581 (1999).
89. Cour de Cassation (Fr.), Mar. 13, 2001, Judgment No. 1414, reprinted in 105
REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 473 (2001); see also Salvatore Zappalà, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for International
Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L.
595, 596 (2001) (discussing the Qaddafi case).
90. Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 21.
91. The question was also considered in Regina v. Bow St. Stipendiary Magistrate &
Others Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Pinochet I), [2000] 1 A.C. 61 (H.L. 1998). In Congo v.
Belgium, the ICJ referred only to Pinochet II.
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immunity exists when a head of state is charged with a serious international crime.92 Although on this view, head of state immunity is no
longer absolute, four of the Pinochet judges limited the exception to immunity ratione materiae, opining that immunity ratione personae would
shield a sitting head of state, even one charged with torture.93
In Qaddafi, the Libyan leader was sued in France based on his government’s involvement in terrorist acts that caused the crash of a French
airliner and the death of French nationals.94 Although highly critical of
the French Cour de Cassation’s decision,95 one commentator’s interpretation of it is far more nuanced than the ICJ’s:
The decision . . . implicitly admits the possibility of exceptions to immunity from jurisdiction of Heads of State in office. The Court concluded: ‘at this stage of development of international customary law,
the crime charged [i.e., terrorism], no matter how serious does not fall
within the exceptions to the principle of immunity from jurisdiction of
foreign Heads of State in office.’ An a contrario interpretation of this
passage leads to the conclusion that there are crimes that constitute exceptions of the jurisdictional immunity of Heads of State. This passage,
however, does not shed any light on the type of immunity involved.96

Thus, the Pinochet and Qaddafi cases actually evince the views of
those courts that an exception to state official immunity exists for at least

92. Pinochet II, 38 I.L.M. at 594 (Lord Browne-Williamson); id. at 626 (Lord Hope
of Craighead); id. at 637 (Lord Hutton); id. at 661 (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers);
Pinochet I, [2000] 1 A.C. at 108–09 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead); id. at 115 (Lord
Steyn); id. at 118 (Lord Hoffman); but see id. at 79–82 (Lord Slynn of Hadley); id. at 96–
97 (Lord Lloyd of Berwick).
93. Pinochet II, 38 I.L.M. at 641–42 (Lord Saville of Newdigate); id. at 643–45 (Lord
Millett); id. at 661 (Lord Phillips of Worth-Matravers); Pinochet I, [2000] 1 A.C. at 107–
09 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead).
94. Cour de Cassation (Fr.), Mar. 13, 2001, Judgment No. 1414, reprinted in 105
REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 473 (2001); see also Zappalà, supra
note 89, at 596.
95. The French high court’s opinion has been described as a “three-page terse and
poorly reasoned decision.” Zappalà, supra note 89, at 596. Zappalà criticizes this holding, inter alia, for failing to consider whether Qaddafi was in fact a head of state; failing
to distinguish between immunity ratione personae and ratione materiae; failing to “clarify whether it considered that exceptions to functional immunity for international crimes
are provided for only by conventional texts or also by customary rules”; and failing to
explain why terrorism is not an international crime. Id.
96. Id. at 600–01. The French version of the excerpt quoted above reads: “[E]n l’état
du droit international, le crime dénoncé, quelle qu’en soit la gravité, ne relève pas des
exceptions au principe de l’immunité de juridiction de chefs d’Etats étrangers en exercice.” Id. at 601 n.30.
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some core international crimes,97 although the cases do not make the parameters of the exception clear. The ICJ must have either ignored or rejected this interpretation when, referring specifically to these cases, it
stated that it had not been able to “deduce . . . any form of exception to
the rule according immunity . . . to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or
crimes against humanity.”98
B. The Post-World War II International Tribunals
The Court next analyzed post-war international practice. Since World
War II, the statutes of every tribunal created to prosecute core crimes
have abolished official position immunity. In Congo v. Belgium, the ICJ
limited the significance of these developments to international courts,
stating that “the rules concerning the immunity or criminal responsibility
of persons having an official capacity . . . do not enable it to conclude
that any such exception exists in customary international law in regard to
national courts.”99 A plausible interpretation of the quoted language
might be that the Court meant only that it found that no such exception
exists in national courts only with regard to immunity ratione personae.
This position is at least defensible because immunity ratione personae
(inviolability) does shield incumbent officials and diplomats from prosecution, even for crimes.100 However this reading is rendered less tenable
because of the Court’s use of the phrase “persons having an official capacity,” which would have been superfluous if the Court were referring
only to immunity ratione personae, which covers all acts, official and
unofficial. And, significantly, “official capacity” is the term used in the
statutes of the international tribunals to refer to immunity ratione materiae. Is the ICJ then saying that no customary law exception for international crimes exists with regard to immunity ratione materiae in national

97. Torture cases were also initiated against Pinochet in France and Germany, presumably because he was not believed to be immune as a former head of state. See Summers, supra note 74, at 90–91 n.142.
98. Congo, 2002 I.C.J. at 21.
99. Id. (emphasis added). From a purely logical perspective, this statement is curious
indeed. Absolute sovereign (including head of state) immunity was a rule of customary
international law that prohibited the courts of one state from sitting in judgment on the
acts of another; that is, by definition it was applicable only in national courts. How then
could any exception to that customary rule not apply in national courts?
100. See supra Part II.D.
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courts?101 That would create a substantial jurisdictional loophole in national courts prosecuting international crimes.
1. Nuremberg
The exception to absolute state official immunity for core international
crimes first appeared in the Nuremberg Charter, which was a response to
the largely failed attempt to judicially punish those responsible for World
War I. During the peace negotiations following the First World War, a
divided Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and
Enforcement of Penalties recommended to the Preliminary Peace Conference that criminal charges be brought against the German emperor.102
The novelty of this proposal was reflected by the objection interposed by
the U.S. representatives on the Commission that:
[they were] unable to agree with this conclusion, in so far as it subjects
to criminal, and therefore, to legal prosecution, persons accused of offenses ‘against the laws of humanity,’ and in so far as it subjects Chiefs
of States to a degree of responsibility hitherto unknown to municipal or
international law, for which no precedents are to be found in the modern practice of nations (emphasis in the original).103

Thereafter, in what was evidently compromise language, the Treaty of
Versailles charged Kaiser William II with “a supreme offence against
international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”104 Commentators,
writing shortly before the Nuremberg Charter was adopted in 1945, disagreed whether the Versailles Treaty charged the Kaiser with a
“crime”105 or whether it merely alleged “breaches not of international law

101. That is precisely how the Special Court for Sierra Leone read the ICJ’s opinion in
Congo v. Belgium in the Charles Taylor case. See Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor,
Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, paras. 50–52 (May
31, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/SCSL-03-01-I-059.pdf.
102. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement
of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (Mar. 29, 1919),
reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT’L. L. 95, 95–104 (1920). The Commission wrote, “All persons
belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offences against the
laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution . . . .”
Id. at 117.
103. S.S. Gregory, Criminal Responsibility of Sovereigns for Willful Violations of the
Laws of War, 6 VA. L. REV. 400, 414 (1920).
104. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), art. 227, June 28, 1919, 2
Bevans 43, 136.
105. Hans Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with
Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CAL. L. REV. 530, 545 (1943).
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but of international morality . . . .”106 In any event, the dispute went unresolved because the Netherlands, where the Kaiser had sought refuge after
the war, refused to surrender him for trial.107
There were, nonetheless, some war crimes prosecutions following
World War I. The disappointing results were six convictions and six acquittals with the longest sentences of four years imprisonment imposed
on two German sailors who intentionally fired upon the survivors of a
British hospital ship.108 However, even this prosecution was frustrated by
the assertion of the “superior orders” defense, according to which a soldier is not guilty of a war crime committed on the orders of a superior
officer, unless such commands are “manifestly and undisputably [sic]
illegal.”109
A superior order can also be what Hans Kelsen referred to as an “act of
State”110 if it was “issued by the government (Head of State, cabinet,
member of cabinet, parliament), or issued at the command or with the
authorization of the government.”111 Thus understood, the two defenses—superior orders and act of State—could operate in tandem to
shield those both up and down the chain of command from individual
criminal responsibility.112 Equally important is the fact that these defenses were customary international law rules applicable in national
courts:

106. George Manner, The Legal Nature and Punishment of Criminal Acts of Violence
Contrary to the Laws of War, 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 416 (1943).
107. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 749 (2d ed.
2000).
108. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET NO. 27-161-2, 2 INTERNATIONAL
LAW 221–22 (1962). Three German officers, one of whom did not stand trial, agreed to
destroy all 234 survivors of the British hospital ship, Llandovery Castle, because they
witnessed the sinking. They were acquitted of sinking the ship based on the “superior
orders” defense but convicted of killing the survivors because this was the “rare and exceptional case” where “it was perfectly clear to the accused that killing defenceless people in the lifeboats could be nothing else but a breach of the law.” Kelsen, supra note
105, at 558–59 n.30.
109. Kelsen, supra note 105, at 558.
110. As Kelsen uses the term “act of State,” it means simply an official act of the sort
over which foreign courts would not have jurisdiction by virtue of immunity ratione materiae. Id. at 541–42.
111. This is true even if the ordered act violated international law. Id. at 556.
112. Kelsen also recognized that these defenses would frustrate most war crimes
prosecutions since a state “is nearly always in a position to justify its acts from the point
of view of national law by the necessities of war” and in “autocratic states like Nazi
Germany” the “legal power conferred by national law . . . upon the head of the State as
commander-in-chief of the armed forces with respect to the conduct of war is almost
unlimited.” Id. at 557.
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The collective responsibility of a State for its own acts excludes, according to general international law, the individual responsibility of the
person who, as a member of the government, at the command or with
the authorization of the government, has performed the act. This is a
consequence of the immunity of the State from the jurisdiction of another State.113

To avoid the problems that had arisen in the post-World War I prosecutions,114 the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter115 made explicit the exception to immunity based on “official position” and the elimination of
the superior orders defense.116 And, despite substantial evidence to the
contrary, at least one commentator of the time concluded that “the law
stated in Articles 7 [official position] and 8 [superior orders] of the Charter . . . was amply supported by general principles of law which constitute a source of international law.”117

113. Id. at 540–41.
114. According to Kelsen’s rigidly positivist view, individuals could not be prosecuted
for war crimes “[having] the character of acts of State” unless their state of nationality
consented in the peace treaty. Nevertheless, he believed that Article 228 of the Treaty of
Versailles could be “interpreted as the necessary consent,” though he recommended “insert[ing] into a future international treaty conferring upon a national or international court
jurisdiction over war criminals, an express provision including war crimes which have
the character of acts of State.” Id. at 561.
115. Kelsen also doubted that “the rules of general internation[al] law . . . are favorable” to the establishment of tribunals to try war criminals by occupying powers on the
territory of their defeated enemy. Despite that potential objection, that was the procedure
adopted by the Allies in the London Agreement which created the Nuremberg tribunals.
Id. at 561–62 n.35.
116. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 7, Aug. 8, 1948, 59 Stat. 1544,
1548 (“The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.”); id. art. 8 (“The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant
to Order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but
may be considered in mitigation of punishment . . . .”). In addition to the United States,
the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain, by whose agreement the Charter was
adopted, it was subsequently ratified by nineteen other states. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 562 (4th ed. 1990).
117. Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 71
(1947). But see Kelsen, supra note 105, at 543–44. Kelsen, a contemporary of Wright’s,
criticizes as “very questionable” the use of “general principles of law . . . as sources of
international law.” Another of Wright’s contemporaries flatly contradicts him: “However,
if foreign law may be applied in this situation without violating the rule against ex post
facto criminal punishment, its application is, of course, limited by the defenses act of
state [immunity ratione materiae] and superior orders since they are part of the law of
war.” Manner, supra note 106, at 419.
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The Charter was an “exercise of the sovereign legislative power of the
countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and
the undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized by the civilized world.”118 In an article written
shortly after the Nuremberg trials ended, Quincy Wright argued that the
parties to the Charter were justified in exercising jurisdiction over the
Nuremberg defendants as an extraterritorial application of their criminal
jurisdictions or as a derivative of their temporary sovereignty over Germany.119 Either way, the trials were examples of “national” courts sitting
in judgment of charges of core international crimes,120 as to which the
official position immunity defense was unavailable because it had been
abrogated by the Charter.
In 1946, the UN General Assembly unanimously affirmed the principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment.121 In 1950, the General
Assembly recalled this affirmation122 and received the International Law
Commission formulation of these Principles, which included the abolition of state official immunity for core international crimes.123 This action swiftly led to the universal recognition that the Nuremberg principles were customary international law.124 Thus, whatever uncertainty
118. Int’l Military Tribunal, XXII Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the Int’l
Military Tribunal 461 (1947) (opinion and judgment as to jurisdiction on Sept. 30, 1946).
119. Wright, supra note 117, at 49–51. In Pinochet II, Lord Millet described in some
detail how the tribunals administered “Nuremberg law”:
The great majority of war criminals were tried in the territories where the
crimes were committed. As in the case of the major war criminals tried at Nuremberg, they were generally (though not always) tried by national courts or by
courts established by the occupying powers. The jurisdiction of these courts has
never been questioned and could be said to be territorial. But everywhere the
plea of state immunity was rejected in respect of atrocities committed in the
furtherance of state policy in the course of the Second World War; and nowhere was this justified on the narrow (though available) ground that there is
no immunity in respect of crimes committed in the territory of the forum state.
Pinochet II, at 647.
120. Genocide was not defined as a separate crime in the Nuremberg Charter.
121. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/64/Add.1 (1946).
122. G.A. Res. 488 (V), U.N. GAOR, 320th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
123. The Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter and the Judgment
of the Nürnberg Tribunal: Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, 5 U.N. GAOR, Sup. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 364, 374, U.N. Doc. A/CN/.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1. The Congo v.
Belgium opinion did not mention this resolution or consider its effect.
124. See BROWNLIE, supra note 116, at 562.
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may have existed prior to World War II regarding the customary law
status of an exception to state official immunity for war crimes and
crimes against humanity, it had been completely erased shortly after the
war. And, since the law of Nuremberg was an exercise of national legislative authority administered in national courts by national authorities,125
it is difficult to see how it could be construed as other than “state practice” evidencing the abrogation of head of state immunity in “national”
courts.
2. Post-Nuremberg
Since then, all of the other tribunals created by the international community to prosecute core crimes have explicitly abolished head of state
immunity. The language in each of these statutes is almost identical with
that in the Nuremberg Charter.126 This consistent and frequent reaffirmation by the international community of a principle of law only reinforces
its customary stature. But, does it represent “state practice” that the rule
is applicable in national courts?
Although these statutes are not directly applicable in national tribunals,
they do represent the consensus of the international community that war
125. In all, 1,416 defendants were convicted by the tribunal established by the United
States to try war criminals within its “zone.” Similar tribunals were established by
France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union who controlled the other zones into which
Germany was divided in the immediate post-war period. These zonal tribunals were the
equivalent of state courts. FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE
NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1949), reprinted in PAUST ET AL., supra note 107, at 633–35.
126. Compare Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7(2), Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) at 39, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) (“The
official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility
nor mitigate punishment.”), with Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art.
6(2), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, at 6, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) (“The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of
State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”), and ICC Statute, supra note 13,
art. 27 (“This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as Head of State or Government . . . shall
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in
and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.”), and Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, art. 6(2), Annex to the Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, U.N.-Sierra Leone, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145, 147
(“The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government
or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”).
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criminals, regardless of their official position, should not escape justice
no matter where they are prosecuted.127 Like the international tribunal at
Nuremberg, these courts were set up to prosecute the most prominent
wrongdoers, leaving the others for prosecution in the national courts.128 It
would be ironic indeed if the statutes of the international tribunals evidence only that state official immunity has been abolished in international courts, since if that were so, a head of state would not be immune
in the international court, whereas those carrying out his orders, if tried
in a national court, would be. This is precisely the outcome in reverse
that the changes in the law of immunities initiated by Nuremberg were
intended to preclude.
This outcome is also not supported by the ICJ’s analysis of the postwar tribunals as “state practice,”129 because the Court did not consider
the significance of the voting in the Security Council for the resolutions
that created the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),130 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),131
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.132 Nor did it refer to the number
of state ratifications of the ICC treaty.133 While scholars argue over the

127. Cf. Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal
Court, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 420 (2004) (“[B]y providing that the ICC Statute applies to
state officials, Article 27(1) establishes that those officials are subject to prosecution by
the ICC even when they acted in their official capacity.”).
128. See, e.g., Press Release, ICTY, Address of the Prosecutor at the Inauguration of
the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of B-H, Sarajevo (Mar. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2046 (last visited Jan. 10, 2006)
(recognizing the concurrent jurisdiction of the ICTY and the national courts).
129. Interestingly, the Court limited its examination to “state practice” and did not
mention “opinio juris,” the other element necessary for the formulation of a rule of customary international law. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 757
(2001). As the inquiry is usually formulated, in order to be recognized as customary international law, a rule must be supported by “general and consistent practice by states”
that is “followed out of a belief of legal obligation [opinio juris].” Id.
130. U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 was adopted by a vote of 15-0. S.C. Res.
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
131. U.N. Security Council Resolution 955 was adopted by a vote of 13-1, with China
abstaining and Rwanda opposing. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3453 (1994).
132. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1315, 14 Aug. 2000, was passed 15-0. Meetings Conducted/Actions Taken by the Security Council in 2000, http://www.un.org/
Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2000.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
133. The ICC treaty, which went into force July 1, 2002, currently has 100 parties and
139 signatories. None of the parties or signatories has submitted reservations or interpretive declarations regarding Article 27 of the treaty which abolishes official position im-
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weight to be attached to such votes134 or ratifications135 or even whether
voting and ratification amount to “state practice” [action] or “opinio juris” [statements of legal obligation],136 in this case all of the assenting
states were self-consciously voting for or ratifying a body of legal rules
that they understood were customary international law.137 Thus their
votes or ratifications are by definition expressions of their beliefs in the
validity of the legal principles contained in the statutes of the tribunals.
Finally, when the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY considered the question
whether “official position” immunity insulates state officials from community. Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, http://
untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty11.asp.
134. Compare Daniel H. Joyner, The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More
Persuasive Paradigm, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 597, 615 (2002) (“[D]ecisions of the Security
Council and the actions taken in pursuance thereof, in and of themselves, do not create
customary international law.”), with John Alan Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the
Emerging Norm of Anticipatory Self-Defense in Customary International Law, 15 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 283, 295 (2003) (“[T]he voting patterns of the United States in the U.N.
Security Council and policy statements made on behalf of the United States in the Security Council are formal state expressions of opinio juris on the practice [anticipatory selfdefense] at issue.”).
135. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ famously opined:
With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before a conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of international
law, it might be that, even without the passage of any considerable period of
time, a very widespread and representative participation in the convention
might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were
specially affected.
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20),
para. 73.
136. Cf. Roberts, supra note 129, at 758, where the author argues that:
[M]odern custom is derived by a deductive process that begins with general
statements of rules rather than particular instances of practice. This approach
emphasizes opinio juris rather than state practice because it relies primarily on
statements rather than actions. Modern custom can develop quickly because it
is deduced from multilateral treaties and declarations by international fora such
as the General Assembly, which can declare existing customs, crystallize
emerging customs, and generate new customs.
137. When they voted unanimously for U.N. Security Council Resolution 827, the
members of the Council clearly understood that they “would not be creating or purporting
to ‘legislate’ that law. Rather, the International Tribunal would have the task of applying
existing international humanitarian law.” Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May
3, 1993). See Zappalà, supra note 89, at 603. The same would hold true for the other
tribunals since their statutes, as noted above, contained nearly identical language regarding the abrogation of “official position” immunity.
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plying with the orders of international tribunals to produce evidence, it
concluded that the exception to state official immunity for core crimes is
customary law applicable in national as well as international courts:138
The general rule under discussion [“official position” immunity] is well
established in international law and is based on the sovereign equality
of States (par in parem non habet imoperium). The few exceptions relate to one particular consequence of the rule. These exceptions arise
from the norms of international criminal law prohibiting war crimes,
crimes against humanity and genocide. Under these norms, those responsible for such crimes cannot invoke immunity from national or international jurisdiction even if they perpetrated such crimes while acting in their official capacity.139

The need for the ICJ to clarify whether there is a customary international law exception to “official position” immunity in national courts
should be apparent. As the above analysis demonstrates, the same authorities on which it relied in Congo v. Belgium support the existence of
such a rule. Moreover, it is especially important for the Court to affirm in
clear terms that the exception applies in national courts because the failure to do so could not only deleteriously affect the prosecution of core
crimes in national courts, but also the ICC’s ability to do so as well.
V. STATE OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AND THE ICC STATUTE
The ICC statute has three separate provisions pertaining to state official immunity. Article 27(1) contains language nearly identical to that in
statutes of the other post-war tribunals.140 It abolishes immunity ratione
materiae in cases before the court. Article 27(2) is new and it eliminates
immunity ratione personae: “Immunities or special procedural rules
138. In Congo v. Belgium, the ICJ found no support for this proposition in the cases of
the ICTY cited by Belgium, among which this case was not included. See Congo, 2002
I.C.J. at 21; Counter Memorial of the Kingdom of Belgium, Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) (Sept. 28, 2001), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobepleadings/icobe_ipleading_countermemorial_belgiu
m_20010928.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
139. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, para.
41 (Oct. 29, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/appeal/decision-e/7102
9JT3.html.
140. ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 27(1) (“This Statute shall apply equally to all
persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity
as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.”).
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which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.”141 Some commentators have asserted that
Article 27(2) applies to immunity ratione materiae as well as immunity
ratione personae.142 However, this reading of the statute seems unlikely,
since it would render Article 27(1) surplusage. Moreover, Article 27(1)
makes a specific reference to exemption from “criminal responsibility,”
the theoretical basis of immunity ratione materiae, whereas Article 27(2)
refers to exercise of the Court’s “jurisdiction,” the concept behind immunity ratione personae.143 If this narrower reading of Article 27(2) is
accepted, then the Court would have jurisdiction over the defendant by
virtue of the waiver of her immunity ratione personae and she would be
precluded from raising immunity rationae materiae as a defense to any
of the substantive charges levied by the Court by virtue of Article
27(1).144
In addition, Article 27, when read in conjunction with Article 98(1),145
is asserted by some to constitute a state party’s waiver of all the immunities of their officials even before the national courts of other state parties.146 The counter interpretation is that the state parties to the ICC Statute have waived state official immunity only with regard to the cases
before the ICC.147 The adherents of both positions seem to agree that

141. Id. art. 27(2).
142. E.g., David S. Koller, Immunities of Foreign Ministers: Paragraph 61 of the
Yerodia Judgment as it Pertains to the Security Council and the International Criminal
Court, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 7, 37 (2004) (“Article 27(2) eliminates both immunity
ratione materiae and immunity ratione personae before the ICC.”).
143. See supra text accompanying note 67.
144. But see Akande, supra note 127, at 420 (“Article 27(2) conclusively establishes
that state officials are subject to prosecution by the ICC and that provision constitutes a
waiver by states parties of any immunity that their officials would otherwise possess visà-vis the ICC.”).
145. ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 98(1) (“The Court may not proceed with a request
for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently
with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.”).
146. See Akande, supra note 127, at 422; Koller, supra note 142, at 38–40; Jann K.
Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive
International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 86, 106 (2003); Micaela Fruilli, The
Question of Charles Taylor’s Immunity—Still in Search of a Balanced Application of
Personal Immunities?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1118, 1129 (2004).
147. See Cassese, The Sharon and Others Case, supra note 86, at 442 (“Under another,
more convincing interpretation, immunities are lifted only in proceedings before the
ICC.”).
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state officials of non-parties retain all their immunities before the national courts of other states, even those that are parties to the ICC statute.148 As will be demonstrated below, in tandem with the decision in
Congo v. Belgium, this could result in total impunity from prosecution
for core crimes for non-party state officials.
Two examples will illustrate this point:
Case 1. Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and a change
in its government, Afghanistan149 could refer to the Court an allegation
that a former U.S. Secretary of Defense had authorized the use of torture
in the interrogation of prisoners captured in Afghanistan during the Afghan conflict, and therefore had committed “grave breaches” of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.150
If the U.S. requests that the ICC defer to its investigation,151 under the
“complementarity” provisions in Article 17 of the ICC Statute, the Court
must defer even to a non-party state, like the U.S., unless “the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”152 A zealous U.S. Attorney, who is a veteran of the ICTY, indicts,
and the former Secretary moves to dismiss the indictment because he
was acting in his official capacity when he authorized the interrogations
in Afghanistan. The U.S. judge, unable to resolve the immunity question
under U.S. law because there are no cases directly on point, turns to the
customary international law of immunity, which is applicable in U.S.
courts.153 She reads Congo v. Belgium to mean that there is no customary
law exception to immunity for core crimes in national courts and grants
the motion to dismiss the indictment.
Case 2. The newly recognized state of Palestine accedes to the ICC
Statute. Thereafter, it charges that a former Israeli prime minister committed a war crime when he authorized the Israeli air force bombing of
civilian targets in Gaza. Palestine requests that the United Kingdom, another state party to the ICC Treaty, arrest and extradite the former prime
minister, who is in London to give a speech.

148. See supra notes 146–47.
149. Afghanistan is a party to the ICC Statute and could therefore make such a referral
under Article 14.
150. Geneva Conventions, supra note 70.
151. See ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 17(1).
152. Id.
153. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.”).
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The former prime minister challenges the extradition request in the
British courts on the ground that he was acting in his official capacity
when he authorized the bombing of Gaza targets. The British judge reads
Congo v. Belgium to mean that there is no customary law exception to
immunity for core crimes in national courts and refuses the extradition
request. In either of these cases could the judges’ immunity decisions
provide bases for the ICC to assert its jurisdiction because the states are
“unwilling” to prosecute?154
The answer to this question is arguably, “No.” The ICC Statute defines
“unwillingness in a particular case” as “proceedings . . . undertaken . . .
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility,” or “proceedings . . . not conducted independently or impartially” or “in a manner . . . inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice.”155 These standards are simply inapposite in a case
where a judge, based on a plausible interpretation of a less than pellucid
decision of the ICJ, determines that a former state official has immunity.156 This is especially true since in these cases the courts’ decisions
are based on immunity ratione materiae which, unlike immunity ratione
personae, does not simply temporarily defeat an assertion of jurisdiction
but rather provides a complete, permanent defense because the alleged
criminal act is chargeable only to the state and not to the individual acting on its behalf.157
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It might be argued that the results predicted above are not ineluctable.
Fortunately, hypothesis is not limited by probability. Even so, it is significant that at least one post-Congo v. Belgium court has read the case
precisely this way. In Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor,158 the Special Court for Sierra Leone said, “the International Court of Justice [in
Congo v. Belgium] upheld immunities in national courts even in respect

154. Professor Cassese has suggested that this should be the outcome. See Cassese, The
Sharon and Others Case, supra note 86, at 442–43.
155. ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 17(2)(a),(c).
156. The other ground for invoking the ICC’s jurisdiction—when a state is unable to
prosecute because of a “total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system”—is obviously inapplicable on these facts. See id. art. 17(3).
157. See, e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
158. Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on
Immunity from Jurisdiction, para. 50 (May 31, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/
SCSL-03-01-I-059.pdf.
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of war crimes and crimes against humanity relying on customary international law.”159
Given this, it cannot be said that the potential for misinterpretation of
Congo v. Belgium in national tribunals is illusory. This is particularly
unfortunate since if one accepts the proposition that the states most likely
not to ratify the ICC treaty are those most likely to engage in conduct it
prohibits, then it follows that non-party state officials will also be those
who most frequently commit core crimes. In such cases, the courts in
their nationality states, where they are most apt to be found, may be motivated to shield them from prosecution by an international court, which
they abjure, by applying a rule of immunity based on a colorable reading
of Congo v. Belgium.
Moreover, the effects will not be limited to non-parties to the ICC
Statute. For even in cases involving state parties, the ICC will be precluded from requesting the surrender of the officials of non-party states
because, if Congo v. Belgium means that non-party state officials have
immunity for core crimes, such a request would require the state party
“to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a
third State . . . .”160 In either situation it is unlikely that the ICC will ever
be able to assume jurisdiction by invoking the exception to the rule of
complementarity for a prosecution that lacks “genuineness.”
Equally unfortunate is the opportunity missed to bring some clarity to
an underdeveloped area of international law. Instead, in Congo v. Belgium’s wake the status of state official immunity is even more in doubt.
After more than a half century of erosion in the rule of absolute immunity from prosecution for core international crimes, it appears that state
officials in national courts can still plead, “L’état c’est moi.”

159. Id. para. 50. In this case, the defendant, the exiled former president of Liberia,
moved to quash an indictment issued by the U.N.-supported Special Tribunal for Sierra
Leone charging him with core international crimes. Id. para. 8.
160. ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 98(1).

